This paper uses the New Earnings
Introduction
The flexibility of wages is a commonly cited difference between continental economies and Anglo-Saxon labour markets, but the concept is generally left imprecise. Notably, the microeconomic and macroeconomic concepts of wage flexibility are very distinct, though potentially related. I say potentially, because microeconomic flexibility papers have generally struggled to produce substantial aggregate unemployment effects, while macroeconomic flexibility papers tend to build in sluggish wage adjustment by presuming some micro-level wage rigidities. The macroeconomic literature has considered both real and nominal wage rigidities, but identifying which of these alternatives is occurring could be difficult. This paper uses a very detailed British data source (the New Earnings Survey) that allows micro and macro measures of wage rigidities to be calculated. In addition, because the data spans 1975 to 2000, relative flexibility can be compared across different periods. This is the simplest form of agreement between macro and micro definitions of wage flexibility, but even this is a challenge for wage flexibility measures. Since Britain experienced both high and low inflation rates in this period-with 1975-1991 inflation rates averaging over 10%, while post 1992 rates have averaged less than 3%s-we can also consider the role inflation plays in wage setting.
Since this paper compares alternative approaches to wage flexibility, the existing literature is reviewed throughout the paper. A substantial part of this paper involves showing what these alternatives reveal in a consistent dataset for the UK. Many of our results are only new for the UK or update existing work, but comparing the results in a consistent dataset does expose the importance of some methodological differences. In addition, the 'facts' of the UK labour market are open to interpretation and the existing results have not always agreed.
One area where this paper offers a new approach is the exploration of real wage rigidities from a microeconomic perspective. This research was driven by the fact that spikes were evident in the distribution at points well above zero, the focus of the nominal rigidities literature. A modified Kahn approach reveals that these spikes and distributional anomalies around the inflation rate are statistically significant. Changes in these patterns turn out to be the strongest evidence that wage outcomes have changed.
For each test (macro-or micro-econometric), we will also address whether the evidence has shifted over time. For many policy issues establishing the current status of the economy is critical, although the history is interesting in that it is the source of conventional views. This is particularly true for the existence of wage rigidities and/or wage responses to unemployment. In either context a case for changes in "wage flexibility" can be made. This paper draws parallels between these literatures and begins to join these approaches. Previous attempts along these lines have found the micro and macro results difficult to reconcile.
This paper asks what if anything has changed in the wage outcomes. The institutional history of wage setting in the UK has clearly changed, and has been well reviewed. 1 
Britain at
Work and the other Workplace Employee Relations Survey results clearly document the decline of private-sector unions and substantial shifts in how work and wage rates are determined outside unions. 2 But despite important shifts in the wage setting process, it is quite possible to have union and non-union wage setting outcomes that are indistinguishable from each other if, for example, non-union firms match a union firm's wage agreements. Another factor that cannot be ignored in wage setting is the change in the UK's monetary policy arrangements. There is every reason to expect that the form of wage contracts might have changed in response to the low and 1 See for example Clegg (1979) and stable inflation rates of the late 1990s. Monetary policy and inflation expectations should be important factors in wage setting outcomes and will be explored to a limited degree in this paper.
See Nickel and Faggio (2002) for an exploration of the effects of unionisation rates on macro wage flexibility measures.
The paper will next describe the data before going onto the macro evidence. This is followed by micro evidence on pay rigidities, which leaves the difficulties of comparing the results for the end.
The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset
The New Earnings Survey panel dataset 3 is an exceptional source of information on wages. The survey covers a random one percent sample of the British workers based on two digits of their National Insurance (NI) number. Because NI numbers don't change and are always used when income is reported to the tax authorities, individuals can be followed if they change employers and residences within Britain. This feature makes the data set preferable to household-based panel datasets where following individuals who change addresses can be difficult or is not attempted.
The survey is of the employers of these individuals who are instructed to report the identified individuals' current earnings each April. In addition, employers report on several key pay determinants for the relevant pay period: the hours of work on which the pay is based, the number of paid overtime hours, whether pay was reduced due to absence and whether any bonuses were paid. In addition, the firm reports whether the individual's 'job' has changed since the previous year. The individual's job may change in the firm without a new occupation code or a change of firms, so wage changes can be analysed for persons continuing in the same position within a firm. These features enable calculation of an unusually pure measure of base pay, free from several of the common sources of errors.
Employers also report the individuals' sex, age, occupation, industry, place of work, and whether a collective agreement or a wage council covers their pay. The firms' do not report the individual's education level because this information is not typically maintained in the firms payroll system. The occupation and industry codes change over the sample period. Helpfully, in the year of the largest change to the occupation coding system individuals' occupations were coded both in the old and new scheme. To construct consistent occupation codes these codes were matched at the three-digit level and aggregated on both sides until the resulting codes were the most likely correspondence to both the old and the new codes. In most cases, the vast majority of individuals within a code don't change their constructed 'consistent' code when the new coding scheme is put into effect. The most difficult cases involve individuals who appear to be line managers in skilled occupations, because it is often difficult to separate senior specialists from managers of specialists. At highly aggregated levels of occupation this isn't a problem and even at more disaggregated levels the pay of these groups are generally quite similar. The effort to tightly control occupational coding was made because the occupation is the primary skill variable in the dataset. Creating consistent industry codes is not problematic at the two-digit level used in this paper.
Despite the straightforward design of the survey, there is a tendency for the survey to undercount low-wage workers and workers in smaller firms. This tendency has been documented in Stuttard (2000) . Under-sampling occurs in part because individuals whose wages are below a threshold are excluded from the tax system and thus no address is provided for their employer. Also despite the ability to follow workers using tax records, a sizable fraction of surveys are returned because the employee no longer works for that organisation. Overall, about 24% of the potential records are not available, with the largest categories being a change of employer (8.7%), survey not returned (5.8%), and out-of-scope (3.7%).
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A summary of key variables in the survey is shown in Table 1 . The range of aggregate pay growth is nearly shown by comparing 1976 with 2000. Throughout the period average wage growth for individuals employed in both years typically exceeds the inflation rate. Narrowing the scope to individuals earning adult rates, working in the same job in both years, and with no loss of pay in either period lowers pay growth, but these figures continue to exceed both inflation and aggregate growth in pay bills. One explanation for this pattern is that firms are able to use turnover and promotions to moderate aggregate wage growth, while offering these increases for workers who continue in the same job.
Macro Evidence on Wage Flexibility
The simplest characterisation of the macroeconomic wage setting pattern in the NES is a wage curve or wage equation. Theoretical models show where some of the key macroeconomic influences enter into to wage setting, but they don't particularly restrict the form that the relationship is estimated (see Blanchard and Katz (1997) ). This leaves the literature primarily based on empirical relationships. The literature on whether the best estimate of the wage response to unemployment is a wage curve or a Phillips curve is extensive, but not conclusive in More details on the design and coverage rates in each year can be found in annual result books ONS (1975 ONS ( -2000 .
that both functional forms are still estimated. 5 I don't have particularly strong opinions about the debate other than the observation that people and companies do appear to think about annual wage changes as well as focusing on wage rates. At a micro level most of the tests are directly focused on wage changes, as wage levels are determined by a wide variety of idiosyncratic factors that are largely unchanged from year to year which are accounted for in the previous years wage.
An overly general starting definition of wage flexibility is that it should alter the relationship between wages and unemployment. We will refine that definition within a pair of empirical frameworks, but the patterns evident in the data are a reasonable starting point. Figure   1 shows the relationship between claimant count unemployment rates and wages changes in Great Britain. The wage rate shown controls for change in the composition of the workforce over time, following the approach of Bell et al. 6 The graph shows periods, for example 1980 to 1985, when the traditional Phillips curve relationship appears to hold. Quite clearly the relationship does not hold in the simple form originally proposed, but currently favoured estimation forms can cope with these movements in the curve. What is more difficult to account for is the prolonged period of the current expansion when inflation rate was steady or dropping in tandem with falling unemployment. This is the period of time where an increasing degree of wage flexibility may be a potential explanation for the Phillips relationship breaking down. 4 These figures were drawn from 1996 New Earning Survey notes, but were not unusual. Out of sample includes pensioners, non-salaried directors, working for spouse, working outside the UK. 5 The macroeconomic estimates most closely follow Bell, Nickell, and Quintini (2000) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001) . Bell et al estimate both forms but favour a flexible form of the wage curve (with lagged wages entering with a coefficient less than one). Staiger et al primary estimates are always in changes, although they consider some alternatives that are consistent with wage curves. 6 A first stage regression wages on age, age squared, 8 occupation dummy variables, 10 industries, 10 regions, and years dummy variables is run. The coefficients on the time dummies represent the average wage rates after controlling for human capital. This estimate is differenced to yield the reported wage inflation measure.
Regions are an important source of both wage inflation and unemployment rate variation in Great Britain. Figure 2 shows claimant-count unemployment and regional wage changes for 9 regions 7 having controlled for workforce composition.
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The wide variety of both unemployment rates and wage changes is evident in the figure. Despite this variation the pattern of wage growth and unemployment appears to change after 1990. This helps to confirm that we can use regional variation to both refine our models of wage inflation and define whether flexibility might have increased.
(1) Wage Curves, Wage Equations and All That
In "Wage Equations, Wage Curves, and All That, " Bell, Nickell, and Quintini (2000) (BNQ) propose measuring flexibility in the context of regressions of regional wages and/or wage changes on regional unemployment rates and panel regression controls. This paper is focused on comparing alternative specifications for relationship between wages and unemployment. We will abstract from this debate and report primarily specifications based on wage changes, for consistency with the microeconomic approaches. This research is highly relevant for establishing the UK baseline because their estimates show the value of applying regional estimates, are very recent (through 1996) and also use the same data source (NES Panel). 
where u jt is the regional claimant count unemployment rate, D j and D t are vectors of dummy variables for regions and time. The last term is a vector of region specific time trends, to account for steady changes between regions. With these controls, no additional explanatory power is gained by including variables that vary only between regions or across time, as this variation can be fully absorbed by the fixed effects. For example, there would be no difference in the R 2 or coefficients of interest if national inflation rates or productivity growth were added as controls to this regression. This regression repeated as a wage change simply imposes β 1 = −1 and moves the α jt-1 term over to the left hand side of the equation.
Our estimates that extend the data set through 2000 are, not surprisingly, similar to BNQ's findings. Table 2 shows baseline regression for a few of the specifications tested in BNQ. These estimates correspond to their estimates for men using the cross-sectional controls.
In all cases, the standard errors have been adjusted for contemporaneously correlated errors across panels. The unemployment rate has a negative coefficient in all of these regressions, but it is not always significant. The coefficient on the log of the unemployment rate is somewhat lower in these estimates than in BNQ but the conclusions are similar. Their preferred specification is with a lagged dependent variable and regional trends and this specification shows the clearest relationship between unemployment and wages in our estimates as well. When following BNQ, we focus on this particular specification for this reason, but its characteristics are worth discussing more fully.
The levels specification leaves a coefficient of 1 on the lagged dependent variable outside the 95% confidence interval making the wage curve specification favoured. However, known panel biases exist for this coefficient 10 making this conclusion less certain in the current estimates. We are not focusing on this issue, so we favour the wage curve specification only because it seems to be statistically more precise on the relationship between regional wages and unemployment rates. Nonetheless, wage equations are estimated for all versions to make the differences between BNQ and Stock Staiger and Watson's approach more clearly delineated.
Both the region and time dummy variables are doing a substantial amount of work in these regressions. Both are generally significant at the 99% percent level, which indicates the importance that general controls have in identifying in this relationship. The controls for regional trends sometimes reduce the significance of the fixed regional dummies, but it is logical to include the intercept shifters as a baseline when trend variation is seen. In any case, regional trends help make the unemployment/wage relationship statistically significant. This could be due to substantial regional productivity trends that are evident in the UK data and will be explored further on. Table 3 re-examines these results when both the men and women are included in the regional wage regressions. The answers are quite similar when women's wages are included.
While the coefficients are slightly (but not statistically significantly) lower the standard errors are also smaller. Conceptually, this is encouraging because men and women must be substitutes in the labour market on some margins. In particular, very high female participation rates in the last decade favours including women wages in aggregate labour market measures.
In the wage curve (or wage equation) framework, wages are said to have become more flexible if they respond more sharply to unemployment. Two of tests performed by BNQ could be considered indications of wage flexibility. They test whether the responsiveness of wages to unemployment is larger in the second half of their sample (1988 to 1996) . They also test whether the coefficient on unemployment varies with the inflation rate, on the basis that if "nominal wages exhibit some degree of downward rigidity, then this will impede the response of wages to unemployment because more falls in nominal wages are 'required' than when inflation is high." They find that the inflation specific test is rejected because the sign actually goes the other way, while there is evidence that wages are more flexible in the later portion of the sample.
Given the subtle differences with BNQ's results in the table 2 and 3, the results of these tests might appear to be a foregone conclusion. This isn't the case, as the flexibility estimators are more dependent on the time variation that the added four years offer: low inflation rates and an expanded period of time when unemployment declines occur with low and stable inflation in the UK. Table 4 shows these results for both the men only and the full sample of wage rates of wage levels and changes with regional trends. The indicators of a change in flexibility are generally statistically significant. Again the answers are softened, but generally not changed, by including women's wages in the first stage.
As BNQ found, the coefficient on the inflation term is positive which implies that the wage increases are smaller when inflation is low in direct conflict with simple forms of nominal wage rigidities. Simple nominal rigidity ought to boost average wage increases at low inflation rates by truncating negative values. It seems possible that this might be due to other explanations that relate inflation and unemployment rather than a direct contradiction of nominal rigidity, but this piece of macro evidence does not support widespread nominal rigidities.
BNQ found that the latter half of their data showed greater wage responses to unemployment, suggesting a more flexible response in labour markets in more recent years.
However, this result is not repeated when the later period is from 1992 to 2000 in any of the specifications. Instead wage responses to unemployment are unambiguously lower and statistically significant in all but one case.
While 1992 is a logical point to break the sample based on the figures 1 and 2, it is still somewhat arbitrary and may be the source of the difference with BNQ. Figure 3 shows the cumulative results of moving the potential break point in the data from 1981 to 1996. This figure is the results of sequence of regressions following table 4 (column 2) with alternative dates for the change in wage setting patterns. The left hand panel shows the expected response to unemployment rates in earlier portion of the data, defined by the year of the break shown on the x-axis. The right hand panel shows the response after the date of the break. The standard error bands shown are for 95% confidence ranges. Choosing an earlier breakpoint in the data yields coefficients which are lower in the later period than in the early data. This result is reversed for any breakpoint after 1988. This sensitivity of the conclusion to the date when a new more flexible wage process is thought to begin limits the usefulness of this result. It is, however, interesting that since 1990 there has been little evidence that wages have been responding to unemployment rates in the UK regions. Of course, it is possible that there just isn't enough data available for the current expansion, but tentatively 1990 stands out as the point where wage setting changes potentially might have had an impact on the wage curve.
(2) Building in Productivity Growth and Inflation
The general panel controls used in BNQ suggest a variety of factors that could be controlled for, notably productivity and inflation. Simply adding these controls to the regressions often makes the results more confusing due to the fact that these other controls are likely to have substantial errors-in-variable problems. Smoothing the series can help to solve these problems, which is part of the approach followed by Stock, Staiger, and Watson (2001) (SSW).
SSW use panel regression on US states to better understand their aggregate findings on the US Phillips curve. Their approach is also suitable for evaluating when the labour market might be more flexible from a macroeconomic standpoint. Their implicit measure of the NAIRU should respond to the wage structure becoming more flexible. Compared to BNQ, the underlying motivation is similar, but these authors impose more restrictions on the functional form of the relationship, by starting with real unit labour costs. The primary analysis is based on the following form:
Where ω is the nominal wage, deflated by current productivity growth (ρ) and inflation (π). Within this form the authors explore a wide variety of variations, which are generally consistent with their primary equation, but the results are not generally sensitive to the other specifications. For our limited purposes only this basic specification is shown. Table 5 shows the estimates for men and women in the 10 British regions. Other than the substantive differences in the labour markets, there are several ways in which these estimates might differ substantially from those reported in SSW. Because we have detailed claimant count information by region the unemployment rate is not effected by sampling variation of the Current Population Survey-based measures which are highly variable in small states. We do not smooth these figures, as we are confident that they accurately reflect conditions within each region. On the other hand productivity figures are difficult to calculate for UK regions and do vary substantially from period to period. We smooth these estimates using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, which yields a smooth, time-varying estimate similar to the Kalman filter used in SSW.
As a check on the importance of regional productivity figures, these regressions are also run using wages adjusted for the smoothed, national trend in productivity growth. These calculations are the best parallel with BNQ, because the time dummies in BNQ would absorb national productivity figures even when they are excluded. The coefficient on unemployment will be different primarily because the unemployment rate is not entered in logs. Finally, subtracting these time-varying aspects of the model from the dependent variable, rather than including an estimate of them in the explained variation lowers the R 2 .
The coefficient on the unemployment rate (regional claimant count) is negative and significant: -0.25 with regional productivity adjustment and -0.17 with national productivity adjustment. The coefficient is larger primarily due to the unemployment rate being entered (untransformed) in levels, but these estimates also have relatively smaller standard errors compared to earlier estimates. The reasonably tight standard errors for the specification with regional productivity are encouraging, given the noisiness of the underlying regional productivity data. On the basis of the strength of the wage response to unemployment this has to be the favoured specification, with a t-statistics of 3.8. Compared to the earlier BNQ estimates this is quite high. In part, this is due to the change in functional form because the estimates based on UK productivity growth that should be quite similar to the BNQ estimates other than the change in functional form also have higher t-statistics.
Staiger et al use these estimates to produce a time-varying estimate of the NAIRU, which would also be possible here.
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The time dummies estimated in these regressions are consistent with a declining NAIRU, but the Kalman filter was not applied to smooth the results. This paper instead focuses on the stability of these coefficient estimates after 1992 and potential interactions with inflation. When regional productivity figures are used in the SSW estimates a major break in the relationship between wages and unemployment is estimated. After 1992, the estimated relationship is essentially zero. The estimated coefficient prior to 1992 is slightly smaller, rather than larger as we might have anticipated if the long sample was simply an average of a larger figure and zero. This result is economically and statistically insignificant when national productivity figures are applied implying that regional productivity patterns are important to this result.
The robustness of this result to alternative dates is assessed in Figure 4 . The coefficients on the unemployment term are always negative and statistically significant. Aside from some uncertainty before the 1983 cut off, the estimates for the early period are quite consistent at around -0.25. The later period estimates are also stable at around -0.25 until about 1990, when the coefficient after rising drops to below -0.4. These changes are associated with a increase in the standard error that keeps the former values within the confidence interval, so it could simply be declining estimate quality as later period becomes shorter.
In the regional productivity augmented regression the coefficient on the inflation interaction is now negative and significant, which is consistent with some form of wage rigidity.
This result is consistent with simple nominal rigidities, but could also factors that are boosting average wages (after controlling for inflation and productivity growth). Inflation is entered in percentage points, so the coefficient yields a substantially different response at higher inflation rates. Both of these results are insignificant when national productivity figures are used to adjust regional wages. Apparently regional productivity patterns are critical. This suggests that the result may be due to of other wage determination features more complicated than simple nominal wage rigidities, because nominal rigidities should be evident when national productivity figures are applied.
Figure 2 revealed important differences in the regional Phillips curves, which could be consistent with substantial differences in productivity trends. In any case, both of these results are consistent with a view that the labour market is different in recent (and low inflation) years.
Furthermore the period-splitting results are consistent with increased flexibility, but the remaining uncertainty surrounding these estimates warrant a deeper exploration. Overall, the macro-econometric evidence, while seemingly indicating that something has changed, is not particularly informative about the nature of the change. 11 The results would likely follow Greenslade, Pierse, and Salaheen (2001) who have shown that aggregate Kalman filter estimates for the UK yield evidence of a declining NAIRU, unless trade effects are accounted.
Micro Evidence of Wage Rigidities
The micro perspective begins with a notional wage change that an employer might desire for a particular job within their firm. This model follows Altonji and Deveraux (1999) . These notional wages respond to the macroeconomic factors highlighted in the model above, but would in addition be expected to vary quite substantially from person to person within the firm.
Defining a notional wage helps to clarify how wages might be less than fully flexible at the individual level. An optimising model of why firms might offer these contracts can be found in Macleod and Malcomson (1993) . The firm's acceptance of restrictions on wage changes is supported by information and renegotiation costs, which could allow either nominal (as the focus in US research) or potentially real (as has been claimed for European wages) rigidities to exist.
In either case if notional wages are defined by it t it it x w ε α β + + = * where x it refers generally to controls particular to individual, and α t is included to account for aggregate factors (like the unemployment rate) in the notional wage contract. The error term, ε it , accounts for individual heterogeneity in every time period. Conceptually this is desired wage variability and not an error in recording or an error by the firm.
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With the notional wage defined, restricted wages follow in a transparent manner depending on the form of the restriction. Altonji and Deveraux (1999) contemplate nominal rigidities of particular form. If the notional wage change is less then zero, but more than -χ than a constrained wage change of zero is realized. If the notional wage change is less than -χ then 12 Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) The x in this equation is a free parameter to account for workers and firms agreeing that an extreme event has occurred, which requires a reduction in wages. It could be well below zero.
Unemployment might occur if the wage is constrained-depending on how the firm is modelled-but should not occur when the notional wage is paid. Altonji and Deveraux (1999) focus solely on downward nominal rigidities, but it is not difficult to extend this set-up to real wage rigidities. A lower and an upper boundary need to established, which we will identify by φ and γ. This specification with real wage rigidities is also consistent with Macleod and Malcomson (1993) , because the key feature for that model is that workers and firms enter contracts with each other recognizing their outside opportunities offer less than the option being negotiated over. Furthermore, there is no reason a more complicated model allowing for two types of contracts couldn't be patterned on the Macleod and Malcomson model. Altonji and Deveraux (1999) use the nominal rigidity equations as the basis of their estimation. This is certainly an interesting approach but the conclusions are potentially dependent on those functional forms, so this paper explores less parametric alternatives.
(1) Distributions
Before moving on to statistical tests it is useful to see what the data suggest might be the key points where restrictions enter. Figure 5 shows the distribution of hourly wages changes for men continuing in the same job, excluding overtime payments and hours. The bars shown in figure 5 are one percentage point wide.
The prominence of the spike at zero varies from year to year, but is always present and clearly larger in low inflation periods. In 1994, the fraction of the workforce with no wage change reached over 6%. Interestingly, the spike at no wage change is just as evident in the 1970s and it is quite high relative to the bars to the right and left of zero. This type of information can useful in identifying nominal rigidities. It may indicate that wage rigidities were just as common or even more common in the 1970s, but the high inflation rates made this form of rigidity less relevant.
There may be similar tendencies to have wage changes only above the inflation rate, which result in either a spike or a clustering of observations just to the right of the relevant inflation rate. Defining the relevant inflation rate when wage changes may have been agreed upon any time in the last year makes this form of rigidity the hardest to identify. The vertical lines in these figures are the inflation rates from December to December in the previous year and February to February. These months were chosen because this would be latest observation on inflation in April when nearly half of UK wage settlements occur, while December represents the annual change and information available in February.
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In any case the spike just above the inflation rate in 1979 or 1985 in figure 5 is potentially indicative of this form of rigidity. The 13 The Bank of England has collected data on the timing of wage settlements in the UK since 1992. It reveals that in recent year over 60% of annual wage settlements become effective between January and April. This database records settlements for over 10 million employees per year, about 39% of the overall workforce.
figure for 1982 offers an interesting contrast in that wages seem to be concentrated just below the inflation rate. The variety of possible inflation references points and complicated possible responses will make this more difficult to evaluate.
The other aspect of a rigidity, whether nominal or real, is that there ought to less mass to the left of zero relative to the right, once the natural decline in frequencies away from the centre is accounted for. The evidence for this seems stronger for real rigidities than for nominal rigidities. The distribution in 1979 shows a substantial drop in mass left of the December and February inflation rates. On the other hand, the 1970s and early 80s distribution that have many bars between the inflation rate and zero seem to be quite smooth through zero, once the spike has been excluded. It is, however, difficult to visually evaluate the fraction below zero or the inflation rate in these histograms, because it is difficult to evaluate how much the frequency should have declined due to being further from the median wage change. This ultimately requires more detailed statistical tests that will be pursued later in this paper.
14 Nonetheless, the existence of the spike at zero is prima facie evidence of wage rigidities, but the nature and full extent of the rigidity is unclear. We would not expect to see rounding (as an error) in this dataset large enough to generate this spike. It could be that firms do adjust pay rates less frequently than once a year, but this would still be a wage rigidity, on an annual basis.
(2) Alternative Wage Measures
The microeconomic model of wage rigidities is fundamentally ambivalent on what rate of pay is relevant, yet this can matter quite a lot to the measurement of wage rigidities. The model is for whatever unit the contract is specified in, but not all of the possible contract forms will 14 There is a literature of tracking moments of the distribution of wage changes, beginning with McLaughlin(1994). Summary measures of wage flexibility, for example skewness or the more sophisticated measures offered by convert noiselessly into hourly wage rates. If the contract is a salary for example and the hours vary around 40 per week, then this hours variation may cause the hourly rate of pay to artificially vary. Some might suggest that this is simply a means for firms to adjust pay, but in most situations where the nominal rigidities are binding demand for output would be low and the firm would want lower hours. In the other direction more flexible pay (overtime and bonuses) are excluded from the hourly figure, removing some of the means the firm could use to adjust pay.
The analysis, so far, has also been limited to those workers still in the same job, but workers can be followed within and between firms in the NES.
The literature on nominal pay rigidities has devoted a fair amount of analysis to errors in reported wage rates. Smith (2001) is particularly good example in that her dataset (the British Household Panel dataset) allows a more direct exploration of errors, because it asks if the pay slip has been referred to. She shows that the existing research base, which had been largely based on household reported earnings, has a substantial problem with errors. The size of the spike at zero was expanded in her work by reporting errors rather than reduced, suggesting that rounding played a substantial role in reported wage rates. The NES is reported by employers and would not appear to be subject to recall errors of this variety due the availability of exact information at the firm.
Altonji and Deveraux (1999) among others used more accurate data sources from internal records of firm to access what fraction of the sub-zero wage changes and concluded that essentially none of the variation below zero wage changes is real according to their firms.
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This type of evidence, while very interesting, is of limited aggregate value because it is typically Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) and McLaughlin (1999) were also explored. 14 Unfortunately, these measures failed to offer any enhancement of the interpretation of the UK data, so these results are not reported. 15 Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) run a small survey in the Washingon, D.C. area. drawn from just a couple of large firms, in a particular industry (frequently financial services), that may not even be representative of typical firms. The NES represents a good middle ground for these issues, particularly if hours variation is carefully considered.
The NES data includes more information on the form of pay than other data sources.
This information allows some alternative measures of pay to be analysed. The alternatives we consider here are a very narrow measure (base pay for workers who are in the same job, and whose hours are unchanged) and a broad measure (gross pay, including bonuses, only limited to those whose pay was not effected by absence). Figure 6 repeats the wage change distributions shown in Figure 5 for the narrow wage definition. While it is true that the definition of wages matters to the exact measure of the size of the spike at zero, Figures 5 and 6 are hardly distinct. This suggests that at least in the NES inadvertent hours variation is not causing the substantial wage change variation evident throughout the period.
Focusing on hourly pay may hide important adjustment mechanisms available to the firms. The other extreme is to allow all sources of pay variation including bonuses, overtime, and non-absence-related hours variation. Figure 7 shows pay variation for workers continuing in the same job on this basis. There is no question that the spikes are lower, but they are still present and the overall shape of the distributions are not dramatically altered beyond being generally more dispersed. The underlying similarity of the distribution of wage changes in both narrower and broader measures of earnings is reassuring. It's not likely that conclusions we might draw using statistical approaches will depend on the exact wage measure considered. Kahn (1997) offers an alternative approach to the issue of wage rigidities that doesn't require detailed functional form restrictions and is less susceptible to real wage rate influences. This regression is applied to parts of a distribution so the values of the dependent variable co-vary in known ways-moving mass to any pint in the distribution must lower other values.
(3) Kahn's measures
Kahn offers a nonlinear estimator that builds in this relationship between observations moving to the spike by requiring that they come from the nearby values. This specification also measures the proportional change instead of the absolute effect within a given wage range, as the β coefficients apply multiplicatively to the fixed effect: Because the Kahn approach uses variation in other years to define the baseline, we can't estimate a degree of wage rigidity for each year, so instead we split the sample into two periods.
This will indicate whether rigidities are becoming more or less pronounced relative to underlying distribution, although the timing of the change is left somewhat obscured.
This approach reveals statistically significant nominal wage rigidities in the hourly wage change distributions. The test results shown in Table 6 are based on the data revealed in Figure   5 , so both male and female wages are included. The basic conclusions are sustained if the test is applied to other wage concepts as well but these results are not reported. The level of the nominal rigidity is lower than Kahn finds in the PSID, measured by the coefficient on the dummy variable for including a nominal zero wage change (D0). She typically gets coefficients well above one for her all worker estimates. This may be due to the nature of either the wage data and how it is collected or the institutions in place. The proportional and linear models do not yield qualitatively different answers in the NES.
When the sample is split, we find much stronger evidence of nominal wage rigidities in the period from 1992 to 2000, based on the coefficients on the dummy variable for including zero wage change in the observation (D0) which is more than doubled in the later period.
Recalling that the zero spikes were far larger after 1992 in Figure 5 , this may not be surprising, although much of the added height of those spikes was due to being closer to the median. It still suggests an increase in wage rigidities, rather than a reduction.
The regressions also reveal that there are statistically significant reductions in the frequencies when wage cuts are involved (based on the coefficients on Dneg). Bars less than zero are about a half percentage point lower than would be predicted based on their distance from the median. This estimates appears to be quite precise in either form, so the results stands with or without the proportional rescaling implicit in the proportional model. When the sample is split this effect is again more than twice as strong in the later period. This result is again independent of the functional form used for the regressions.
Extending the early and late period break analysis to the Kahn measures results in Figures   8 and 9 . The conclusion that nominal rigidities (at zero) have not declined in the later period are robust up to any split in the sample up to 1993. After that the results change dramatically, although this could be an artefact of the limited data available to identify the underlying wage distribution. In terms of nominal wage cuts, the evidence is generally weaker in that the later period is often statistically insignificantly different from zero and also similar to the early period.
The sharp turndown at the end of the sample implies a sudden drop in nominal wage cuts, but this again may be due to an inadequate number of years to establish the baseline. In any case the evidence does not point to a clear reduction in nominal wage rigidities.
This result seems to counter the conclusions of either Smith (2001) or Nickell and Quintini (2000) as both papers conclude that nominal rigidities are always insignificant in UK data. One critical difference in this conclusion is the use of a tighter testing strategy. These previous studies were more focused on how large the spike was relative to prevailing view of wage setting that argues that wage cuts are uncommon. Thus the standard was lower on showing some flexibility in UK wage setting patterns. We wish to establish whether patterns have changed and needed a tighter standard. That said it remains to be shown using the Kahn approach what level of rigidities are economically significant. 'Small' nominal rigidities may or may not be important.
(4) Real Wage Rigidities
An interesting feature in figure 5 is the evidence of spikes, or at least a collection of observations, around the inflation rate. While real rigidities have been discussed in the literature as one of the key differences between the US and European labour markets, the nominal wage rigidities literature has avoided exploring part of the distribution above zero. This is in part due to papers wanting to connect to the theoretical literature on sources of monetary non-neutrality, but it has also been due to these features being harder to define. Extending Kahn's methodology to real wage rigidities involves two major complications.
As with any of these estimates the reference value of inflation is not known and wage responses around the inflation rate might be more diffuse, and thus harder to identify. Indeed, spikes and bumps in wage change distribution around the inflation rate have not been as evident as those at nominal zero. To account for the first issue, we estimate the model for both December or February inflation rates. The data shown in Figure 5 suggest the second may not be a problem in this data set, although the effects do vary from year to year.
To the Kahn nominal wage rigidity measures we add dummy variables for wage changes including the inflation rate, negative real wage changes, and being one or two percentages up from these values or one percentage point below the inflation rate. This specification parallels the earlier implementation and is run simultaneously with the nominal controls, because in low inflation period more than one effect could occur at wages a given distance from the median. The covered ranges are described by At the onset, it is not obvious that it will cover most of the cases where wages bunch near inflation rates seen in figure 5 , but it is reasonable place to start. Running counter to this approach is the fact that in some years the apparent concentrations around inflation moved above or below the rate. This technique will struggle to find a real wage setting pattern if these moves are too common.
The full sample estimates show statistically significant evidence of real rigidities, based on the coefficients on DR0. Table 7 shows estimates using the February inflation rate, while Table 8 shows the coefficients as estimated using the December inflation rate. Recall that the December rate was chosen because it would be available when much of the spring wage settlement process was under way. Interestingly, the scale of these estimates is similar for the linear estimate to those suggested for nominal rigidities. This is also true for the coefficients on negative real wage changes (DRNeg) and these coefficients will apply to a larger fraction of wages, particularly in the high inflation years. The coefficients around the inflation rate do not fit with the menu cost story with collecting small deviations at round figures that was consistent with the nominal estimates. Instead, these nearby wage change proportions (DR1, DR2, and DRN1) tend to show increases (when statistically significant), which is consistent with different time frames on inflation being used, as these deviations will tend to be small in most years.
Splitting the sample yields a similar picture on the early and late periods. The evidence does not support a reduction in wage rigidities, as evidenced by the rising coefficient on wage changes, DR0. Comparing across the full range of possible splitting points (in Figure 10) shows that these estimates are generally higher in the later period. The coefficients for bars near zero real wage change are also typically negative, along with the coefficient on negative real wage changes. In the linear specification the other boosted categories are nominal zero and just below the inflation rate. Nominal zero frequencies are actually little changed from the Table 5 results suggesting that the apparent rise in nominal rigidities in the later period was associated with a reduction of real wage rigidities. Generally, including real wage controls did not substantially alter the nominal-only estimates. Together these tables show little movement toward a more flexible labour market, while nominal rigidities only increase partially.
Real wage rigidities potentially represent a large wedge between notional wages and the actual outcomes, when inflation is positive. This characterisation is weakened in part because the evidence for reduced real wage cuts is not strong in almost any period as shown by Figure   11 . This may not be critical though as nominal wage cuts are reduced and these would all be real wage cuts. A more structural approach may be needed to better untangle the evidence on real wage rigidities, although these estimates are certainly consistent with some real wage rigidities.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to collect both macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence on pay flexibility from a consistent source, the New Earnings Survey Panel dataset. The increase in the perceived wage flexibility is not seen in the macroeconomic approach recommended by Bell, Nickell, and Quintini (2000) , but the estimates based on Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) do seem to reveal some important changes in wage adjustment. The coefficients on unemployment in both forms of the wage equations are affected by the inflation rate in my regressions, although the direction of that effect is contradictory in the two approaches. The estimates which follow Bell, Nickel and Quintini (2000) approach are statistically significant but are inconsistent with a simple model of nominal wage rigidities. The overarching conclusion is that the macroeconomic tests leave much to explain, but the estimates have revealed some patterns that are worth trying to reconcile with other sources of evidence. They also suggest focusing on the beginning of the 1990s as the starting point of the change.
The microeconomic evidence reveals clear evidence of nominal wage rigidities. These rigidities are just as evident, indeed stronger, post 1991. This is again a surprise when compared with the view that the UK labour market has become more flexible. The nominal wage rigidity coefficients are somewhat smaller than Kahn showed in PSID for the US over the full sample period, but the values for current estimates is similar. The issue for any estimates of rigidities is what effect do these rigidities have on employment. It is beyond the focus of current version of this paper to say whether these rigidities are large, but they are statistically significant. The NES data are suitable for a parametric analysis of rigidities and the costs they impose along the lines of Altonji and Deveraux (1999) , but this work is left to future work.
Finally, this paper revealed a significant pattern of real wage rigidities. Some unusual clustering around the inflation rate is evident in the raw wage change distributions. The Kahn (1997) approach is extended to explore the parts of the wage change histogram around the inflation rate. One difficulty in finding real wage rigidities is that even if every contract was organised around the inflation rate they would vary based on the time of year that the contract was established. December and February annual inflation rates were used in the analysis, but both show similar evidence of real rigidities. The estimated level of real wage rigidities is steady or even rising in the 1990s. This leaves the correspondence between alternative wage flexibility measures puzzling. 
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